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The emperor is naked: Moral diplomacies and the ethics 
of AI
With AI permeating our lives, there is widespread concern regarding the proper 
framework needed to morally assess and regulate it. This has given rise to many 
attempts to devise ethical guidelines that infuse guidance for both AI development 
and deployment. Our main concern is that, instead of a genuine ethical interest for 
AI, we are witnessing moral diplomacies resulting in moral bureaucracies battling 
for moral supremacy and political domination. After providing a short overview 
of what we term ‘ethics washing’ in the AI industry, we analyze the 2021 UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (Category II) tasked with drafting the Rec-
ommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and show why the term ‘moral 
diplomacy’ is better suited to explain what is happening in the field of the ethics of 
AI. Our paper ends with some general considerations regarding the future of the 
ethics of AI.
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Artificial intelligence (AI) is a shining star within the technology world. All other 
technological innovations and artefacts pale in comparison with what AI, in all its 
shapes and sizes, promises to offer. However, as the saying goes, all that glitters is 
not gold. AI technologies have pushed the significance of dual-use to the extreme: 
whether we think about autonomous weapons, facial recognition technologies 
or already mundane decision-making software, all of these applications can be 
used for both good and bad purposes. For example, decision-making algorithms 
can improve efficiency, but they can also reinforce racial prejudices and biases 
as they may discriminate based on race or gender (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; 
Noble 2018). Other AI systems, such as scoring systems, identify and exploit weak-
nesses that individuals may not be aware of themselves (Citron and Pasquale 
2014). And while discrimination, manipulation or exploitation have plagued so-
cieties since the dawn of civilization, unlike with human decision-making, AI sys-
tems can operate at scale, instantly and automatically, with the potential to affect 
people in the flash of a second, “at orders of magnitude and at speeds not previ-
ously possible” (Yeung, Howes and Pogrebna 2019). It is precisely these actual and 
potential harms that AI could create that have driven the massive interest in the 
ethics of AI. 
In this paper, we explore the implications and consequences of the particular 
interests of both private companies and states alike for the development of ethical 
guidelines for AI systems. In the first section, we look at some critiques of private 
companies’ focus on the development of ethical codes of conduct and guidelines 
for ethical AI. We show that most researchers tend to focus on the problem of 
‘ethics washing’, which is the superficial and even hypocritical use of ethics for the 
avoidance of state regulation. The criticism of companies’ attempts to self-regulate 
is based on the belief that they will always strive to advance their own interests, 
thus their efforts of devising ethical or responsible AI systems will not do away 
with the wider problems generated by the societal deployment of these technol-
ogies. However, a hidden presupposition behind these types of analyses is that if 
private companies should not be left alone to their own devices, then states should 
take the lead in the efforts to advance ethics in the field of AI. In the following sec-
tion, we show that, in practice, states don’t fare too well in this domain either. We 
take as a case study UNESCO’s attempt to create yet more guidelines for ethical AI, 
in order to show that both transnational organizations and states alike use ethics 
as a locus of power. We advance the term ‘moral diplomacy’ to describe the strat-
egy of using the language of morality, by transnational organizations, states and 
the industry alike, to protect and advance forms of technology that can advance 
certain economic and political interests. In the concluding remarks, we claim that 
the fight over ‘AI ethics’ is actually a political fight and that the ethical guidelines 
and regulations for AI advanced by ‘moral diplomacies’ are just a way of signal-
ling allegiance to certain ethical values and principles, without actually moving 
towards their accomplishment. 
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2. From ethics washing to the bureaucratization of ethics 
While the ethical implications of AI have been addressed since the 1960s, the emer-
gence of machine learning and neural networks has brought ethical debates in to 
the mainstream (Morley et al. 2019). ‘AI ethics’ is now sort of a buzzword in the field, 
as it is employed to name and describe a whole array of moral, legal, societal and 
political concerns associated with the development and implementation of AI tech-
nologies. One of the most frequently employed tools that is believed could help re-
solve the ethical issues generated by AI are documents containing ethical principles, 
frameworks, checklists and guidelines to aid the development and implementation 
of AI technologies. These documents are considered a universal panacea for the po-
tential harms generated during technological development and implementation, a 
fact shown by the diversity and multiplicity of organizations that have rushed to 
issue such documents, from industry, to governments, transnational organizations, 
academia and NGOs. An exhaustive list of all these documents and organizations 
would probably take the whole space of this paper, so here we settle with mention-
ing just a few of them: IEEE’s (2019) Ethically Aligned Design “Vision”, Artificial In-
telligence at Google (2018) manifesto, OpenAI, Partnership on AI or The Foundation 
for Responsible Robotics. Jobin et al. (2019) identified no less than 84 documents 
of a non-legal nature (research and position papers excluded) expounding ethical 
principles and guidelines for AI. Most of these documents are issued by private com-
panies, followed by governmental agencies, while academic institutions, supposedly 
the only impartial and objective organizations, are the last issuers of such recom-
mendations and guidelines (AI Ethics Lab 2020; AlgorithmWatch 2020). 
Although the attention paid to ethics in AI development and deployment is a 
heartening development, the focus on ethical guidelines is not without its critics. 
One of the first problems identified by the critics is that most of these documents 
are principle-based, embracing a deontological approach (Mittelstadt 2019). Prin-
ciples are highly abstract standards for good, but they tend to be vague as their 
application is most of the time context sensitive. As a consequence, principle-based 
AI guidelines have been criticized for not being sufficiently action-guiding (Hagen-
dorff 2020b; Héder 2020). This means that it is not clear to AI practitioners how to 
put these principles into practice, as principles, by themselves, do not play a role 
in informing and training the moral reasoning needed for ethical behaviour in a 
practical context (Greene, Hoffmann and Stark 2019). This is further proven by the 
fact that, despite the richness in ethical guidelines, 79% of tech workers report that 
they would like more practical, down-to-earth instructions on how to deal with and 
address ethical problems in technology development (Miller and Coldicott 2019). 
The ineffectiveness of professional codes of conduct or of any sort of guidelines 
for the development of responsible AI is further complicated by the fact that AI sys-
tems can be used in a wide range of domains, from medicine to warfare and many 
others. Further, AI developers do not have a common background, as they come 
at AI from various domains and will be specialized in different disciplines, which 
also means that they might have different moral obligations to attend to (Filipović, 
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Koska and Paganini 2018). However, ethical guidelines tend to reduce AI developers 
to a single expertise, which cannot but obscure the complexity of reality (Mittelstadt 
2019). Moreover, any sort of deviation from these principles would be hard to no-
tice and also difficult to punish, as these documents lack enforcement mechanisms 
(Hagendorff 2020a; LaCroix and Mohseni 2020). 
Another contentious issue connected to these ethical guidelines is the lack of 
diversity of their creators. In his analysis of 22 AI ethics guidelines, Hagendorff 
(2020b) shows that the ratio of female to male authors is 31.3%, and makes an in-
teresting observation that those reports authored primarily by men tended to focus 
on particular issues, such as privacy or transparency, ignoring the fact that when AI 
systems are deployed, they become embedded in complex sociotechnical systems. 
This shows that male-dominated reports tend to oversimplify the problems these 
technologies give rise to when they complement or even substitute human deci-
sion-making, ignoring important issues such as welfare, fairness or even ecological 
concerns (Hagendorff 2020b). What is more, Jobin et al. (2019), in their analysis of the 
corpus of the principles and guidelines on ethical AI, noticed an underrepresenta-
tion of developing regions, such as Africa, Central and South America and Central 
Asia, which of course denotes an existing global power imbalance that it seems is 
even perpetuated in AI ethics debates. This raises questions of global fairness, but 
it also denotes a sort of technological determinism implicit in most documents. It is 
almost as if humans can only react to these technologies as if they are a force that we 
cannot shape (Greene, Hoffmann and Stark 2019). Further, most documents have as 
their locus design processes, mostly ignoring business or political decisions, revenue 
models or the incentive mechanisms that after all shape design processes (Yeung, 
Howes and Pogrebna 2019). 
If the lack of specificity and diversity were the sole issues with these ethical 
guidelines for the development and deployment of AI, then there would be no 
significant reasons to worry. After all, these are problems that could, in principle, 
be solved by more careful deliberation and consideration of the purposes and ap-
plication of ethical guidelines/codes of conduct. Another, more important wor-
ry, though, is that these high-level principles and documents are used as a façade 
by the industry, and essentially as a ploy to delay or plainly avoid policy-maker’s 
reasons to pursue regulation. To put it more simply, the underlying idea in almost 
all of these documents is that states’ role in regulating AI technologies can be side-
lined, while the role of the private sector should be overly-emphasized (Wagner 
2018). In 2019, the term ‘ethics washing’ was first used by the philosopher Thomas 
Metzinger to describe the instrumentalization of ethics by industry, in his critique 
of the European Commission Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (Metzinger 2019). 
Responsible for the creation of this document was the 52-member High-Level Ex-
pert Group on Artificial Intelligence (HLEG AI), which was heavily dominated by 
industry, with only four ethicists part of the team. Metzinger complains that the 
guidelines issued by HLEG AI are “lukewarm, short-sighted and deliberately vague” 
precisely because ethics is instrumentalized in order to “distract the public and to 
prevent or at least delay effective regulation and policy-making” (Metzinger 2019). 
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The inspiration for this term ethics washing comes from the already popular term 
‘greenwashing’. The suffix ‘-washing’ is used to denote a gap between the behav-
iour of a business or government and how that behaviour is framed or commu-
nicated to the public (Peukert and Kloker 2020). While greenwashing refers to the 
discrepancy between the claims companies make about the environmental impact 
of their products/services and their actual environmental impact (Voinea and Usz-
kai 2020), ethics washing denotes the proclaimed adherence to ethical standards 
by AI companies in order to escape regulation and to reassure customers and other 
stakeholders of their ethical commitment (Bietti 2020; Wagner 2016; Peukert and 
Kloker 2020; Rességuier and Rodrigues 2020). Besides in the creation of AI working 
groups meant to issue guidelines for ethical AI, ethics washing is also manifested 
in ethics partnerships for AI, such as in the employment by industry of in-house 
philosophers and ethicists with little or no influence on design processes or busi-
ness operations (Bietti 2020), and also in the funding by Big Tech of academic work 
on responsible or ethical AI, which is really meant to obscure problems regarding 
business practices or the political implications of AI systems (Abdalla and Abdalla 
2021; Ebell et al. 2021). 
The use and abuse of ethics within the technology world seems to be a strate-
gy employed by various stakeholders in order to create the impression, for both 
the public and governments, that internal self-regulation by science and industry is 
more than enough for dealing with the risks raised by AI systems (Bietti 2020). In a 
paradoxical turn of events, ethics is now used to protect and foster the status quo, 
while eliminating the possibility of moral progress in the technological world. Many 
important and stringent ethical implications of AI technologies, such as the social 
and political impacts of algorithmic decision-making, the environmental implica-
tions of data processing for AI, and the rise of fake news/propaganda/deep-fakes, as 
well as the private funding of public research institutions in the field of AI remain 
virtually unaddressed within these documents (Hagendorff 2020b). 
In what follows, we claim that ethics washing is not the most appropriate way to 
describe the instrumentalization of ethics in the technology world, because it tends 
to frame the avoidance of regulation of technology companies by public authorities 
as something that is bad in itself. But the question of whether governments are bet-
ter placed to regulate complex, constantly evolving and changing technologies, such 
as ML-based AI, remains unaddressed. We advance the term ‘moral diplomacy’ to 
describe the strategy of using the language of morality, by both transnational organ-
izations and the industry alike, to protect and advance forms of technology that can 
advance certain economic and political interests. Just as the moral diplomacy con-
ceived by US President Woodrow Wilson was an instrument of fighting back against 
governments that opposed or were hostile to American interests, so the moral di-
plomacies in today’s AI landscape are a way of advancing political and economic 
interests and of nipping in the bud discussions addressing important questions about 
power arrangements. In the following section, we show what moral diplomacies may 
consist of by analyzing the UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (Category 
II) tasked with drafting the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. 
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3. The birth of moral diplomacy and AI governance
Despite the views of Immanuel Kant (1998), in day-to-day life, ethics is seldom 
“pure”, that is based solely on supreme or ultimate moral principles. When it comes 
to applying ethics in practice, like in the development of ethical guidelines for AI 
systems, ethics is surrounded by many other ‘vocabularies’ and intellectual disci-
plines: law and legal thinking (especially human rights), economic and institutional 
approaches, but also political stakes or social opportunities, etc. The main peril for 
ethics in the highly dynamic landscape of AI is for it to become just a pretext or a 
decorative, floral adagio in attempts to protect and entrench the status quo. When 
ethics becomes mere etiquette, it fails to provide deliberative mechanisms, sound 
judgment and true answers. Other risks are not to be neglected either: ethics could 
become an instrument of struggle or persuasion, a motive for negotiation (that in-
volves trading and not pondering values or principles) or even a way of ‘washing’ the 
image of companies. To put it simply, ethics is in danger of becoming a (cultural or 
even technological) instrument of domination. 
What happens with AI ethics and the attempts to codify it (in the form of recommen-
dations or White Papers) is the continuation of a trend that started in early moderni-
ty. In search of impartiality, ethics is de-personalized, becoming an art of legalization, 
architectonics or building systems (Iftode 2021). Moreover, ethicists are beginning to 
lose sight of a fundamental problem in ethics, that is, moral motivation (Iftode 2021). 
Moral motivation cannot be merely extrinsic, it cannot lie only in the power of a law, a 
precept, or of any recommendation, no matter how convincing it is. It should be clear 
for everyone that governing AI systems, for their lifetime cycle, through ethical codes 
and guidelines, or recommendations is not a solution, but is increasingly becoming 
part of the problem. AI is not like the commons – be it pastures, rivers or Wikipedia – 
for which there are models of good collective governance (Ostrom and Hess 2007). AI 
systems are not common resources (although maybe data should be), and perhaps that 
is why the open-source development model has not caught on in the AI research world. 
We call ‘moral diplomacies’ the widespread arrangements of negotiating and 
gaining consensus on the moral guidelines for AI development. Until now, there 
have been at least three notable productions of moral diplomacies: the OECD Rec-
ommendation of principles (adopted on May 22, 2019), the EU guidelines, and the 
in-the-making UNESCO Recommendation. The outputs of moral diplomacies are doc-
uments, in a word-based format, which necessarily implies the emergence of moral 
bureaucracies capable of interpreting and making decisions on their basis. This is a 
mechanism similar to academic or medical ethical committees, or Institutional Re-
view Boards (IRBs), the institutions putting ethical codes into practice (Molina and 
Borgatti 2019). In short, ethical AI governance, transcribed in codes or recommen-
dations, is a product of moral diplomacies, further creating moral bureaucracies. 
In what follows, we focus on UNESCO’s approach to AI ethics, mainly because it is 
one of the most transparent and open to inquiry1 cases of moral diplomacy, allowing 
1 This goes hand in hand with the subjective reason for choosing UNESCO: one of the authors was an 
expert participating in the discussions.
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a detailed analysis. Not only was the draft Recommendation made public (UNESCO 
2021a), but also the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts (Category II) tasked with 
creating the Draft Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence was lives-
treamed and kept online afterwards (UNESCO 2021b). It is also important to stress 
that this forthcoming Recommendation is non-binding, i.e. it has no legal effects 
and creates no obligations (compared to a Convention, which should be instilled 
in national legislations), and it will not come into effect before being accepted by 
member states in another high-level meeting, namely the UNESCO General Con-
ference. Before the Intergovernmental Meeting, there was an arduous process of 
drafting the Recommendation, prepared by the Ad Hoc Expert Group (AHEG) based 
on wide multistakeholder consultations. The Recommendation included a preamble 
and 141 articles structured around the aims, objectives, values, principles and areas 
of policy action (UNESCO 2021). It was accompanied by a preliminary study and a 
final report. Also, before the meeting, the member states were invited to send their 
comments and amendments, which in turn produced a huge document of almost 
1000 pages. So, the amount of work and the outputs was highly impressive. From 
this point on, the deliberation began in earnest. Keep in mind here that our short 
analysis is limited to the first session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts 
(26–30 April 2021).
This debate is representative for the making of public AI ethics. If we take the 
ideal model of discourse ethics (Habermas 1990; Bohman and Rehg 2017) as a 
frame of reference, we can see that not all of its “pragmatic presuppositions” have 
been fulfilled. First of all, (1) we need to use the linguistic expressions in the same 
way in order to ensure we have the same meanings in play; then, (2) none of the 
relevant arguments can be ruled out. Third, we must take into consideration (3) 
only the strength of the arguments, and not their rhetorical power of persuasion. 
For things to work, (4) all the participants must be motivated to find the best ar-
gument. Last but not least, (5) no-one should be excluded. The result of the delib-
erative process should be the intellectual empowerment of the participants, and 
its foundation lies precisely in the equal respect accorded to everybody involved. 
Undoubtedly, equal respect was given to all the participants who were able to 
intervene and propose amendments to the articles of the Recommendation. Con-
dition (5) was met, in that no-one present was excluded. It should be noted, how-
ever, that not all states were represented, with some having only observers there 
(such as the USA, which had withdrawn from UNESCO) or were altogether absent.2 
The first condition was impossible to fulfil in practice; for example, participants 
had different meanings for some of the more contentious terms, such as ‘gen-
der equality’ or ‘universal’, meanings that did not necessarily converge. Further, 
some arguments were ruled out – which contradicts condition (2) – only because 
of different experts’ rhetorical power of persuasion – thus going against condition 
(3). Further, the experts were not limited to ethicists and AI researchers, many of 
them were human rights lawyers and activists, or diplomats, appointed by their 
states to advance specific values and principles resonating with their own foreign 
2 A novelty of this meeting was its online format: it took place on Zoom.
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and domestic policies. What was really problematic, though, was the unfulfill-
ment of condition (4): here, the aim was not to find the best arguments, but to 
block or support various positions without appealing to moral grounding, rather 
to political expediency.
The specific procedure rules for UNESCO clearly stipulate that discussions on 
the Recommendation draft may advance by consensus. And here resides the first 
difference between the philosophical and the diplomatic employment of ethics. 
Ethical debate cannot have either as a mere goal, or as a method, consensus at any 
price. Consensus could be the goal of institutions in gaining uniform practices, 
but philosophical grounding is bound to the strength of the argument and truth 
finding. Undoubtedly, in a pragmatic sense, reaching agreement is important, but 
not at the price of distorting its foundation. During this first round of debates, 
one key question was to find the sources of normativity for the Recommendation. 
Here, the divide was apparent from the beginning (especially during the April 
28 meeting): some state representatives insisted on human rights law as having 
priority and should be the only universal, normative source of the document (UN-
ESCO 2021b). Others insisted on ethics and its particular contribution as an ex-
tension into areas that human rights law cannot cover; as an answer to the focus 
on ethics, some others decried this as ‘ethics washing’. One of the participants 
(observer) said: “The language of ethics has the merit of shedding light on the 
blind spots in current (positive) international law. At present, the Recommenda-
tion has nothing to add to the current legal framework.” Also, one ethicist bluntly 
expressed his opinion in the chat box by stating: “I understand that ethics is out 
of the scope of this discussion” and then adding a touching quote from Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, “Evil is the disjunction of virtues, it is to have a virtue without the 
others”. This reaction says a lot about the actual divorce between legalistic think-
ing and ethical deliberation and, even more, about the unrealistic expectation 
that an ethical code or recommendation will make AI systems virtuous. Indeed, 
the delegates spent almost a whole day of the session rejecting an amendment on 
the role of international law which, in the end, was made less prominent within 
the Recommendation. We do not wish to comment on whether this is good or bad, 
right or wrong, but we want in fact to stress that the focal points of the debate 
did not seem to have in view the ethics of AI, but rather the concealment of the 
political interests that would like to instrumentalize AI. Article 11 of the draft, 
“While all the values and principles outlined below are desirable per se, in any 
practical context there are inevitable trade-offs among them, requiring complex 
choices to be made about contextual prioritization, without compromising oth-
er principles or values in the process, especially human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (UNESCO 2021, 7), was the biggest bone of contention. The prolonged 
debate around it, taking up nearly an entire day, is paradigmatic of the whole 
context of drafting ethical principles and norms for AI systems. Because the locu-
tion ‘trade-off’ has different meanings within different domains of discourse, the 
debates regarding what it refers to more precisely, and what ethical values and 
principles should be prioritized in case of a conflict, almost blocked any advance 
in reaching agreement.
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The inherent conflict between states has moved into the realm of AI ethics, as 
another attempt to move from the power of arms to the power of speech (which 
is a fundamental way of preserving peace through culturalization). AI ethics is a 
territory unclear to many, ideal and conceptual, but with immense material im-
plications. In this game, the clash between lawyers and ethicists is obvious. And 
even more obvious is the struggle between the ‘old world’ of human rights, and 
the ‘new world’ prone to use AI in governing populations. It parallels the symbolic 
struggle between universalists (the Western World) and generalists (Iran, China 
or Venezuela) over the nature of human rights. All this is part of an ‘ethical arms 
race’ between organizations (international or industry alike) for exerting influ-
ence upon the future of AI development. In all this context, ethics in its practical or 
applied exercise becomes the loser, the abandoned puppet. As long as these kinds 
of documents are non-binding, the effort seems directed towards something differ-
ent from the red-lines or the way AI should be governed for the common good. The 
incompatibility between ethics, a pluralistic and revisable system (or even fully 
particularistic sometimes), with its trade-offs, limitations and balancing, and in-
ternational law, with its positive, rigid foundation, is hard to overcome. This adds 
to the main issue, namely that when consensual methods are applied in ethics, the 
risk is that the achieved compromise will totally reduce the normative power of 
ethical guidelines. 
Almost everything that is ethically ‘revolutionary’ in this kind of document has 
been or could be eliminated by ‘diplomatic games’. For philosophers and ethicists, 
it is frustrating to see that several conditions of discourse (or argumentation) ethics 
are not fulfilled and, even worse, that deliberation becomes bartering. Ethics was 
seen as part of the art of politics by Aristotle. For international organizations, ethics 
has rather assumed the role of a shield against recognizing the political nature of the 
creating institutions. For example, in the UNESCO document, there are no remarks 
about power and the power relationships built around AI. But power asymmetries 
are real and actual. Moreover, top-down approaches, based on human rights norma-
tivity, are necessary, but not sufficient alone. 
4. Concluding remarks: Regulating AI, a catch-22 situation? 
The presupposition behind criticisms of companies’ capacities to self-regulate 
through ethical guidelines is that states, especially democratic ones, are better 
suited to take the lead and to impose clear red-lines concerning the development 
and deployment of AI systems. In the above discourse, we showed that states 
don’t fare too well either in this domain. The ethics of AI, as it is approached 
today by industry or transnational organizations and states, is yet another proxy 
for advancing various types of interests – be they financial in the case of private 
companies, or political in the case of states. This is another example of the fact 
that technologies are not mere neutral functional tools, but are also ways of do-
ing politics by other means, as Winner argues (Winner 1986). Technologies are 
political because they are shaped by human choices and institutional structures, 
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and in their turn, they shape the way things are done in a society. The politics of 
AI systems lies in the fact that such systems can change the distribution of power 
at a societal level, empowering some, while making others even more vulnerable 
than before (Voinea 2016). Currently, the ‘fight’ over AI ethics is actually a fight 
over the specific forms of power and authority that these technologies should 
incorporate. 
While not as absurd and paradoxical as Yossarian’s conundrums from Joseph 
Heller’s famous 1961 novel Catch-22, the ethics of AI seems to be in a catch-22 situa-
tion. On the one hand, the recent push for the industry’s self-regulation has proven 
to be unsuccessful. Companies have shown only an instrumental interest in the tools 
that normative and applied ethics can bring to the table for regulating AI. Naturally, 
one might think that the solution to the drawbacks of this strategy might be to bring 
states and international organizations in to fill in the gaps, like most economists 
tend to think that we should do when we face a market failure. 
As our analysis of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts tasked with 
drafting the Recommendation on the Ethics of AI shows, this heuristic approach is 
not useful in our case. Our main claim is that, at its core, the issue lies with the fact 
that the ethical guidelines and regulations for AI are advanced by what we term 
‘moral diplomacies’, which are employed by both private (i.e. the dominant compa-
nies from the industry) and public organizations (i.e. states and other international 
organizations) for elevating their status by the use of ‘moral talk’ or, as Tosi and 
Warmke (2020) put it, for grandstanding purposes. 
Whether it’s for avoiding more robust regulation and attracting better employ-
ees, like it would be in the case of a company like Google (Voinea and Uszkai 2020), 
or for politicians to signal to the electorate that they care about Responsible AI 
(post-industrial democracies) or to make their opposition to Western democracies 
and their WEIRD morality (Haidt 2012) internationally known, it has become clear 
that we cannot solve a political problem with ethical ramifications (the regulation 
of AI) just by simply drafting codes of ethics and establishing moral bureaucracies. 
Even if we were to leave aside the classical criticism of bureaucracies and bureau-
crats as being simply budget maximizers (Niskanen 1971; 1994), an opaque ethical 
infrastructure that does not contribute to the development of moral and intellectual 
virtues for the individuals who actually work with AI (Constantinescu et al. 2021) 
would be nothing more than a waste of both public and private resources, and with 
potentially deleterious consequences. 
This quasi-pessimistic outlook on the future of AI ethics can be supplemented 
by an even further troubling implication for ethicists who want to have an impact 
outside just academia. Some ethicists might wish to shape the outlook of the indus-
try on AI by seeking employment at Google or other major players in the industry. 
For others, the option of ensuring ethical checks and balances is part of public AI 
moral bureaucracies. Our claim is that any ethicists who might strive to advance 
an unbiased agenda for ethical AI and at least aim to marginally improve the cur-
rent status quo of AI ethics will probably face what Walzer famously labelled as 
“the problem of dirty hands” (Walzer 1973). For example, an ethicist working for 
Google might have to accept some privacy intrusions for profit-maximizing pur-
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poses in order to push for a more robust concern of the company for eliminat-
ing unfair biases in the ways in which the company processes data, for instance. 
Similarly, working as an AI moral diplomat for a Western democracy might mean 
that a person would need to sacrifice some of their principles either due to the 
electoral interests of their employer (i.e. the Government and/or political party in 
power) or because intercultural negotiations might entail an unsettling balancing 
of human rights in order to push an agenda that could be acceptable for countries 
with a different moral weltanschauung, i.e. world view. The only question that 
remains, then, is what is the acceptable threshold after which compromises with 
both industry and states or international organizations alike becomes morally un-
acceptable. 
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